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The Anti-Lien: Another Security
Interest in Land*
Uriel Reichmant
The law recognizes various security interests in land, which are de-
signed to provide two distinct advantages over unsecured interests: the
right to priority over general creditors in bankruptcy proceedings, and
the right to satisfy the debt from a specified parcel of property. This
article proposes recognition of an intermediate concept between secured
and unsecured debt: an interest in land that secures to some extent the
repayment of a debt, but does not possess the twin characteristics of full
security interests. This interest in land, the "anti-lien,"1 is a preventive
measure; the debtor's power of alienation and power to grant another
security interest are suspended while the debt remains outstanding. The
anti-lien creditor has no powers or rights other than this passive rem-
edy; for all other purposes, he is treated as a simple debt creditor.
The few cases that have dealt with contracts containing anti-lien re-
strictions have limited the analysis to a narrow question: did the con-
tract create an equitable lien (that possesses the characteristics of a
traditional security interest) or merely a personal obligation? Framing
the question in this way eliminated consideration of the anti-lien alter-
native-an alternative that is potentially useful when a regular security
interest is unavailable or economically impractical. This paper attempts
to explain deficiencies in the application of the equitable lien analysis
to the anti-lien situation and argues the case for the anti-lien concept.
Just a decade ago, documents evidencing an anti-lien approach were
widely used in California. In fact, this California experience is signifi-
cant for any discussion concerning the anti-lien interest. It illustrates
the difficulties in applying an equitable lien approach to the "negative
* The author wishes to thank Professors Allison Dunham and Richard Epstein of The
University of Chicago Law School, Professors Owen Fiss and Grant Gilmore of Yale Law
School, and Jacob Frenkel of The University of Chicago. The author's premises and con-
clusions do not necessarily reflect the views of these readers.
T LL.B. 1967, LL.M. 1972, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. J.S.D. Candidate, The Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School.
1 The term "anti-Hen" has not been used previously to refer to the negative covenant
that is the subject of this article. So-called "anti-lien" clauses have been written into mari-
time charter contracts, see 2 G. GLMORE, SEcurrry INTmEsrs IN PERSONAL PRoPERTY, § 38.4,
at 1014 (1965), but these clauses are not relevant to the present inquiry.
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mortgage" and suggests that there is a need for recognition of the anti-
lien interest.
Part I of this article will examine the reaction of the California
courts to these negatiye covenants. In Part II, the conclusions drawn
from this historical analysis are used to set forth and discuss the features
of the anti-lien interest. The issue is not a parochial one. Although
California's strict rules regarding the satisfaction of secured debts may
have provided the stimulus to experimentation with the "negative
mortgage," the commercial advantages afforded by the proposed device
should be of interest in other jurisdictions, especially since several cases
indicate that instruments similar to the anti-lien have occasionally been
employed outside California.
I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ANTi-LiEN INTEREST
A. Early Interpretations: The "Negative Mortgage" As a Personal
Obligation
Prior to 1964, courts considered the "negative mortgage" issue in
only three reported cases..2 Although the courts faced varying factual
situations and applied different legal analysis, they concluded in each
case that an absolute negative covenant 3 not to transfer or encumber
one's land did not create an equitable lien.
In the first case in this series, Knott v. Shepherdstown Manufacturing
Co.,4 the defendant corporation agreed "not [to] give any voluntary
lien of any character whatever on any of its buildings, machinery, or
grounds so long as [the debt to the plaintiff] remains unpaid."5 The
plaintiff and another creditor who had known about the agreement ob-
tained judgments against the insolvent defendant, which subsequently
conveyed its assets to a trustee for payment of its debts. The plaintiff
claimed priority, arguing that the agreement was intended to give him
a first lien upon the company's property. The court decided that the
covenant "is simply negative; an agreement not to do a particular
thing. The creation of a lien is an affirmative act, and the intention to
do such acts can not [sic] be implied from an express negative."8
Since the Knott court was primarily concerned with the express
promise not to transfer, it had little difficulty concluding that an "ex-
2 G. G LmoRE, supra note 1, § 38.8, at 1008.
3 If the restriction is not absolute, an equitable lien will not be recognized. B. Kupper-
heimer & Co. v. Mornin, 78 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1935), is an example of the "imperfect
restriction" line of cases. See note 16 infra.
4 30 W.Va. 790, 5 S.E. 266 (1888).
5 Id. at 792, 5 S.E. at 266.
6 Id. at 796, 5 S.E. at 269.
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press negative" was not the equivalent of an intention to grant a secu-
rity interest. Moreover, it was irrelevant that the Knott agreement
(which did not provide for recordation) was not recorded; for, con-
sidered on its face, the agreement, even if recorded, would not have
been capable of a different interpretation.
The second case, Western States Finance Co. v. Ruff, 7 was decided 35
years after Knott. Ruff sold his land in fraud of his wife's inchoate right
of dower. The purchaser, Kaser, agreed to compensate Mrs. Ruff for
her dower interest within two years, at which time Mrs. Ruff was to
deliver her title deeds to him. Kaser also promised, in a recorded agree-
ment, that he would not transfer the land until he compensated Mrs.
Ruff. The covenant was violated when, without first compensating Mrs.
Ruff, Kaser transferred the land to the plaintiff. After receiving Mrs.
Ruff's demand for payment of the debt, the plaintiff-purchaser brought
an action to quiet title. During this time, however, Mrs. Ruff had lost
her dower rights through divorce; thus, her last resort was the negative
covenant.
The court decided that no equitable lien was created. Citing Knott,
Judge McCourt explained that, according to the "usual rules of inter-
pretation," the words of the negative clause could not be construed as
expressing the intent to create a lien. "It is clear," said the court, "that
the defendant had no lien on Kaser's interest, in the event that Kaser
held the same but did not pay defendant within two years."'8 The court
seemed to be concerned with the fact that although a mortgage creates
a right to satisfy the debt by foreclosing on the collateral, the asserted
lien in this case (created by the negative covenant) was not necessarily
related to the debt clause-the debtor might default on his promise to
pay the debt and yet not violate the terms of the "negative covenant."
If that happened, Mrs. Ruff could pursue only the remedies available
to unsecured creditors.9
After observing that the covenant was drafted in a way that allowed
the promisor to transfer an unencumbered title,10 the court noted that
7 108 Ore. 442, 215 P. 501 (1928), rehearing denied, opinion modified, 108 Ore. 455, 216
P. 1020 (1923).
8 Id. at 451, 215 P. at 504.
9 Id. Cf. Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 497, 507 (S.D.N.Y.
1935), remanded, 85 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1936) (discussed at note 16 infra).
10 The covenant read: "[S]hould .. . Kaser, at any time during the period of two years
...desire to sell[,] . . . such conveyance shall not be made ...until the obligation is
fully paid ...." 108 Ore. at 445, 215 P. at 502. The court concluded that if Kaser had
transferred the land after the two years without paying the debt, he would not have
breached the covenant not to transfer. Even a conveyance within the two years would not
have created a lien. "Prior to such sale and conveyance by Kaser, there was no lien. A
conveyance then was required to raise the lien. But then it would be too late, the title
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"[t]here was nothing in the relations of the parties or in the subject mat-
ter or character of the transaction which charged the words of the con-
tract with a broader, more comprehensive or different significance than
they ordinarily and naturally possess .... The terms of the contract
which were intended to secure and protect defendant are found in the
arrangement for the deposit of defendant's deed in escrow .... ."11 Al-
though this language could indicate that in a proper case the court
would consider the remedy of reformation of contract,12 it is also pos-
sible that the court was expressing a willingness to interpret such an
agreement as consistent with an intention to grant a lien,13 at least if
there were sufficient additional evidence to support this view.
The third case in the series is Fisher v. Safe Harbor Realty Co.14
Fisher, the plaintiff, received partial payment for the sale of his stock
in the defendant company. The company guaranteed the balance of the
sale price and secured the guarantee with a recorded promise "that the
land owned by the company shall not be encumbered with or by mort-
gage so long as there are any amounts due."'I5 When two creditors ob-
tained subsequent judgments against the company, Fisher claimed pri-
ority in reliance on his "equitable lien." The court cited Knott'6 for
would have passed from Kaser and beyond the reach of any lien ...." 108 Ore. at 452,
215 P. at 504. But cf. G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 42 (2d ed. 1970) (conditional mortgages).
11 108 Ore. at 454, 215 P. at 505. Dower rights are not legal interests; they are protected
only by courts of equity. See W. BuaiY, REAL PROPERTY § 85, at 190 (3d ed. 1965). The
court did not infer the intention to create an equitable lien from the fact that the docu-
ment was recorded, because the recordation of the agreement was probably only an
attempt to give subsequent purchasers notice of the inchoate dower rights.
12 When proof of fraud or mistake is established, a contract may be reformed and the
reformed clauses specifically enforced. See 2 A. CoaBN, CoNmiAcrs § 344 (1950). Since a
promise to give a mortgage will be incorporated into the contract, the creditor will have
an equitable lien. But the terms that supposedly were agreed upon must be proved by
more than a mere preponderance of evidence. Id. § 345. In some jurisdictions, courts have
refused to enforce a reformed clause, considering it violative of the Statute of Frauds.
Id. § 840. The typical case in which reformation is ordered for mistake involves an incor-
rect description of particular items; it differs radically from the case discussed in the text.
For a recommendation of caution in rewriting the terms of a contract, see H. McCLxrocx,
PRINCIPLES OF EQuTrry § 100, at 270 (1948).
13 If the latter interpretation is correct, Ruff may bridge the gap between the early
cases, which failed to find an equitable lien in the anti-lien contractual provisions and
Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 892 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964), which
held that the anti-lien can be interpreted as giving an equitable lien. See text and notes
at notes 23-25 infra.
14 88 Del. Ch. 297, 150 A.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
15 Id. at 299, 150 A.2d at 618.
16 Id. at 303, 150 A.2d at 620. In addition to Knott, the court cited several cases that
were not directly on point. B. Kupperheimer & Co. v. Mornin, 78 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1935),
for example, is one of the "imperfect restriction" cases. The debtor promised not to sell
or encumber his land, but agreed to pay the creditor from the proceeds if he did sell the
land. The court held that this language gave the promissor the privilege and power of
conveyancing and mortgaging, and interpreted the clause as a personal promise to pay
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the proposition that "a negative covenant not to do a certain thing...
[is] not an unequivocal manifestation to secure a debt by a lien on
land" and decided against "the imposition of an equitable lien to the
detriment of subsequent judgment creditors." 17
out of future funds. Redemptorist Fathers v. Purdy, 174 Wash. 358, 24 P.2d 1089 (1933),
contained an anti-lien clause, but the parties clearly intended a statutory lien.
The court also cited Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 497
(S.D.N.Y. 1935), remanded, 85 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1936), one of the corporate debenture cases.
(For a detailed discussion of these cases see 2 G. GILMoe, supra note 1, §§ 38.2-38.4;
G. OSBoRNE, supra note 10, §§ 42, 43; Jacob, The Effect of Provision for Ratable Protection
of Debenture Holders in Case of Subsequent Mortgage, 52 HAv. L. Rav. 77, 102-07 (1938).
In Kelly, the debenture holders were "secured" by the issuing corporation's promise not
to give a security interest in its assets unless the debenture debts were secured equally
and ratably. The question litigated was whether subsequent security interests given to
other creditors who had notice of the debenture terms were subject to the rights promised
to the debenture holders. The majority of cases in the corporate debenture series have
given an affirmative answer. E.g., Kaplan v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 156 Misc. 471, 281 N.Y.S.
825 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Chase Nat'l Bank v. Sweezy, 281 N.Y.S. 487 (Sup. Ct. 1931), aff'd mem.,
236 App. Div. 835, 259 N.Y.S. 1010, aff'd mem., 261 N.Y. 710, 185 N.E. 803 (1933). But these
cases were decided on the ground that there was a breach of trust. Although some com-
mentators have suggested reading the Kelly covenant as implying an affirmative promise,
G. OSBORNE, supra at § 43, at 87, quoting Jacob, supra, at 106, this suggestion is
hardly applicable to the anti-lien situation.
The district court in Kelly took the position that creditors with notice were not subject
to the rights promised to the debenture holders. 11 F. Supp. at 508-512, but the court of
appeals appears to have rejected this position, 85 F.2d at 63. See 2 G. GLMsoRE, supra
at § 38.3, at 1007. The district court's emphasis on the facts that unspecified securities
served as collateral for a constantly changing group of people and that there was no
prohibition of sale, 11 F. Supp. at 507-8, distinguishes the case from Minderhout.
The last two cases cited in Fisher dealt with payment from a certain fund and were
also not directly on point.
17 38 Del. Ch. at 303, 150 A.2d at 620. Although it may seem from the quoted passages
that the decision was based on lack of notice ("unequivocal manifestation" and "detri-
ment of subsequent judgment creditors'), the court assumed arguendo that the covenant
gave sufficient notice. In another passage, the court stated dearly "that the agreement
... evinces no intention to create a lien .... " Id.
Some courts have attributed significance to whether the negative promise was violated.
See Browne v. San Luis Obispo Nat'l Bank, 462 F.2d 129, 134 n.5 (9th Cir. 1972); Tahoe
Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 4 Cal. 3d 11, 20-21; 480 P.2d 320, 328, 92 Cal. Rptr. 704, 712 (1971).
The analysis is probably based on a reverse application of the theory of executory
mortgages. When a debtor promises to give a security interest in the future, a court of
equity will recognize an equitable lien only if the contract is specifically enforceable.
G. OSBORNE, supra note 10, § 25. In the negative covenant situation, no injunction can
be granted if a violation has not occurred or is not about to occur. But if the agreement
is breached (for instance, if a contract for sale is signed), the court may intervene and
prevent completion of the transaction. Since the right is specifically enforceable, secures
the payment of the debt, and relates to specific property, it could be analyzed as a right
similar to an equitable lien.
The fact of violation should not be relevant to the equitable lien issue; the sole ques-
tion should be whether there was an intention to grant a security interest. It should be
noted that in two of the three cases discussed in this section, the promises were probably
not violated at all.
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B. Coast Bank v. Minderhout: The Foundation Case for the
Equitable Lien Interpretation
1. The Decision. Coast Bank v. Minderhout,18 a 1964 decision of the
California Supreme Court, establishes that a negative covenant (in
which the borrower promises not to transfer or encumber his land
until the debt is paid in full19) may be construed as an equitable lien.
The debtor in Minderhout, in violation of a recorded covenant, trans-
ferred his land to the defendant, who had actual. notice of the agree-
ment. The bank accelerated the debt pursuant to the contract and fore-
closed on the land. Since the defendant's general demurrer did not
contest the bank's allegation that the parties to the original transaction
intended to create a security interest in the debtor's land, the question
before the court was not "what meaning appears from the face of the
instrument alone," but "whether the pleaded meaning is one to which
the instrument is reasonably susceptible." 20
The court concluded: "The instrument restricts the rights of the
[original debtors] in dealing with their property for plaintiff's benefit;
it describes itself as 'For use with Property Improvement Loan,' it
specifically sets forth the property it covers, and it authorizes plaintiff
to record it. These provisions afford some indication that the parties
intended to create a security interest and are clearly sufficient to support
the pleaded meaning."21 Because the court held that the bank had an
equitable mortgage and that the acceleration clause was thus a reason-
able restraint on alienation, the validity of the promise not to transfer
or encumber, which the court viewed as a separate covenant, became
irrelevant to the issue of foreclosure. 22
18 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
19 For a full reprint of the Minderhout agreement see id. at 312 n.2, 392 P.2d at 266
n.2, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 506 n.2.
20 Id. at 315, 392 P.2d at 267, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
21 Id.
22 This decision was welcomed by some commentators, for example, Hetland, Real
Property and Real Property Security, The Well Being of the Law, 53 CALIF. L. REv.
151, 171 (1965), and criticized by others, for example, 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 1, § 38.4,
at 1017; Comment, Coast Bank v. Minderhout and the Reasonable Restraint on Aliena-
tion: Creation of Commercial Ambiguity, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 954 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as Coast Bank and Reasonable Restraint]. See also G. OsBoRNE, supra note 10, § 44; 1A
P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTs, SECURED TRANSACrIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CoDE § 23.10 (1973) [hereinafter cited as P. COOGAN et al.].
The decision revived the dormant issue of the "negative pledge." (In the realm of
personalty, there has been a small amount of litigation between creditors who had re-
ceived a debtor's promise not to transfer or encumber personal property, and subsequent
creditors who claimed security interests in the same property. Apparently none has been
reported since the debenture cases. See note 16 supra; 2 G. GILMoa, supra note 1, § 38.2.)
Minderhout was decided in a period in which Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
was being subjected to intensive scrutiny' by the legal profession. Although Minderhout
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The Minderhout court did not recognize a novel category of equi-
table liens; the court apparently believed that the anti-lien agreement
fell within one of the traditional categories.23 The controversy between
Minderhout and the earlier cases relates, therefore, to the requirement
of intention. The California Supreme Court did not suggest that the
document by itself established the intention to give a security interest,
but rather held that the anti-lien agreement could indicate and be
consistent with that intention. Since the written covenant was am-
biguous as to intention, the court concluded that oral testimony should
be admitted in such a case to determine whether the pleaded intention
actually existed. Thus, the court did not interpret the negative cove-
nant as an affirmative act. Instead, it treated the clause, which was a
promise restraining the debtor from engaging in certain transactions, A
as a prohibition that could manifest, in conjunction with other evidence,
an implicit intention to grant a security interest.
The Minderhout court's technique of interpretation is sound. "Equi-
table lien" is not a term of art,25 and it is neither possible nor desirable
to define precisely the requirements for its recognition. A consensual
equitable lien can be found not only when a written document specifi-
cally establishes the intention to grant a security interest in certain
property,26 but also when that intention can be inferred from the agree-
ment and the surrounding circumstances. One line of cases has held,
for example, that a conveyance subject to an obligation to support the
grantor and to refraini from transferring the land prior to the grantor's
death can be construed as creating an equitable lien.27 Thus, any criti-
cism of Minderhout must be based on its policy implications.
was a real property case, it called attention to a problem that the draftsmen of Article 9
had (intentionally) not taken into account. Id. § 38.5.
23 Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 811, 314, 892 P.2d 265, 266-67, 38 Cal. Rptr.
505, 506-07 (1964). The relevant categories include a promise to give a mortgage, a promise
to hold property as security for a debt, and conveyance of a defective legal "mortgage."
G. OSBORNE, supra note 10, § 35.
24 Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d at 317, 392 P.2d at 268-69, 38 Cal. Rptr. at
508-09. (rhe court doubted the validity of such a clause in a lien.)
25 See 1 G. GmmoRE, supra note 1, § 7.2.
26 4 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQurrY JuiSPRUDENCE § 1235 (5th ed. 1941):
[E]very express executory agreement in writing, whereby the contracting party suf-
ficiently indicates an intention to make some particular property, real or personal,
or fund, therein described or identified, a security for a debt or other obligation ...
creates an equitable Hen upon the property so indicated, which is enforceable against
the property in the hands not only of the original contractor, but of his ... voluntary
assignees, and purchasers or encumbrancers with notice.
Although a consensual equitable mortgage can also be created by verbal agreement, in the
absence of a writing a party usually alleges the existence of a nonconsensual equitable lien
or, failing that, one of the exceptions to the Statute of Frauds. G. OsBoRNE, supra note 10,
§§ 51, 53, 57.
27 Iowa Farm Credit Corp. v. Halligan, 214 Iowa 903, 241 N.W. 475 (1932); McClure v.
1974]
The University of Chicago Law Review
2. Policy Considerations. The factual context of Minderhout differs
radically from that in the earlier cases. Minderhout involved a com-
mercial practice rather than a homemade mortgage. According to Pro-
fessor Hetland, the commercial "negative mortgage" was used in
California as a security of convenience; the terms of the document were
vaguely drafted to enable the lender to choose whether to treat the
recorded instrument as either a mortgage or a personal obligation.
28
Under certain circumstances, the lender would prefer to treat the loan
as unsecured, for example, to avoid the "one form of action" rule29 or
the limitations imposed on lending against second mortgages.30 In other
cases, when the borrower transferred the property and disappeared
without paying his debt or was declared bankrupt, the creditor would
obviously prefer to treat the covenant as a lien. Under this interpreta-
tion, the debtor was usually unaware of the lender's strategy and
assumed that the document imposed only a personal obligation.3'
Professor Hetland has suggested that the decision in Minderhout was
designed to turn the option over to the debtor. In his view, it is simply
"poetic justice" that the borrower, not the lender, becomes the one
to decide whether to treat the agreement as a mortgage or as a void
restraint on alienation.32 If the lender chooses to sue on the note, for
example, the debtor may treat the covenant as a lien; the personal
action will be barred and the creditor's only remedy will be fore-
closure.33
The proof, maintains Professor Hetland, "that the transaction is
secured will be, in almost every case, overwhelmingly clear."3' 4 He
continues:
To start with, the bank drew the agreement. The agreement de-
scribes specific real property and prevents the sale or encumbrance
thereof until a certain indebtedness is paid. The indebtedness is
Cook, 39 W. Va. 579, 20 S.E. 612 (1894); cf. Gallaher v. Herbert, 117 Ill. 160, 7 N.E. 511
(1886). But see cases cited note 145 infra.
28 Hetland, supra note 22, at 167. See Coast Bank and Reasonable Restraint, supra
Dote 22, at 964 & n.66. The cases cited in the latter, however, dealt only with pledges of
personal property.
29 CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1974).
30 CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 1227, 1542 (West Supp. 1974), (Banks and Trust Companies). See
Coast Bank and Reasonable Restraint, supra note 22, at 964.
31 Tahoe Nat'1 Bank v. Phillips, 4 Cal. 3d 11, 19-20, 480 P.2d 320, 327, 92 Cal. Rptr.
704, 711 (1971). Hetland, Real Property Security Devices, in CALORNmA REAL EsrATE SE-
cukn TRANSAcErONS § 2.25, at 28-29 (J. Hetland ed. 1970); Hetland, supra note 22, at 167.
32 Hetland, supra note 22, at 167.
33 It should be remembered that the deficiency judgment in California is limited to
the difference between the amount due and the fair market value of the mortgaged prop-
erty at the time of sale. CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE §§ 580a, 726 (West Supp. 1974).
34 Hetland, supra note 22, at 168.
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subject to acceleration either upon default in payments on the con-
current promissory note or for breach of the agreement, through
sale, additional encumbrance, or even failure to pay taxes on the
specifically described property. The whole thing is recordable.
Simply to describe it is to describe a mortgage [except where the
debtor claims that he did not so intend] .... Furthermore, the
creditor would have difficulty in trying to explain what it is if
not a mortgage.385
Professor Hetland concludes that institutionalized lenders will prob-
ably return to the use of traditional, unambiguous forms of security
interests rather than leave the option with the debtor. Moreover,
lenders who are prevented by statute from lending against a junior
lien 8 will have an incentive to terminate use of the anti-lien when it
would constitute a junior lien. In fact, earlier anti-lien agreements by
such lenders might be considered statutory violations.37
Since the California courts have acknowledged and followed Pro-
fessor Hetland's explanation, his analysis should be subjected to careful
scrutiny. His interpretation of Minderhout as an attempt by the court
to prevent further use of the negative mortgage is undoubtedly correct.
But his justifications for the Minderhout decision are not free from
difficulty. Professor Hetland stresses the preservation of justice between
the contracting parties. But this is certainly not the only concern;
strangers to the original transaction may also be affected. Consider the
situation of a purchaser from the original debtor. If the courts tend to
treat anti-lien agreements as mortgages (which Professor Hetland says-
they seem on their face to be), the only fair protection for the pur-
chaser is a deduction of the unpaid debt from the purchase price
(since the acceleration clause will become effective). The Hetland
approach thus fails to provide the debtor with an opportunity to
exercise his "option" unless he shifts the liability to an innocent pur-
chaser who believes the original obligation is simply a personal one.
On the other hand, if courts tend to treat anti-lien agreements as per-
sonal obligations, purchasers may make windfall gains, and creditors'
expectations may be defeated.
Under Hetland's interpretation, moreover, litigation between credi-
tors and transferees can be resolved only by a judicial finding concern-
ing the actual intent of the original debtor, who probably either will
not appear before the court, or, if he does appear, will testify according
to his personal interest in the outcome of the litigation. 8 The factual
85 Id.
86 See note 94 infra.
87 See Coast Bank and Reasonable Restraint, supra note 22, at 964.
38 The debtor may have transferred the land subject to the existing debt and would
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issue of intent will thus foster litigation and promote uncertainty in
land transactions.
Professor Hetland's interpretation also fails to preserve justice be-
tween the original parties. Because the option will probably be exer-
cised when a suit is brought against the debtor, the "debtor's choice"
will be influenced by contemporaneous considerations of self-interest,
not by the original intent. The debtor may have been a victim of mis-
representation, but the lender should not be "taught his lesson" in a
way that causes even more obscurity and waste.
If the purpose of the court was to eliminate the "negative mortgage"
practice, why did it not simply hold that the clause did not confer a
security interest? The court's ambiguous hints to institutional lenders
could have been overlooked or even misunderstood. Professor Gilmore's
criticism seems justified:
Negative covenants should not, it is submitted, be allowed to
operate as informal or inchoate security arrangements, even against
third parties with notice. If a creditor wants security, let him take
a security interest in some recognized form: mortgage, pledge, an
Article 9 security interest or whatnot. If he wants protection
against third parties, let him take possession of the collateral or
file. Nothing is to be gained by giving a shadowy effectiveness to
informal arrangements which conform to no recognized pattern. 39
The explanation for the California Supreme Court's approach is that
the court, undoubtedly aware of the shortcomings of the new rule, was
faced with a widespread commercial practice involving millions of
dollars of loans secured by Minderhout-type documents. 40 If the ruling
of the lower state court, 41 holding that the "securing" obligation was
void in toto, had been affirmed, debtors could have transferred their
lands with impunity. After making his most recently due installment
payment, a debtor could have left California, and his creditor might
have had no recourse. Affirmance of the lower court decision could have
involved substantial bad debt losses.
Minderhout must be interpreted as a compromise reached in light of
the rules of law and commercial practices prevailing in California at
have a motive, therefore, to shift the burden onto the transferee. On the other hand, he
may already have been declared bankrupt and might favor the interests of the transferee.
39 2 G. GmmoRa, supra note 1, § 38.4, at 1017. See also 1 G. GLENN, MORTGAGES § 17.2,
at 104 (1943): "We know at least this, that there is such a thing as a mortgage or pledge;
and if people deliberately try to dispense with the use of such device, they cannot obtain
relief, at law or in equity, that is based upon any theory of security." (footnote omitted).
40 Coast Bank and Reasonable Restraint, supra note 22, at 962, citing the California
Bankers Association Amicus Curiae briefs.
41 Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 32 Cal. Rptr. 584 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
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the time of the decision. Prior to this decision, the California courts
enforced a strict interpretation of the civil code's prohibition of re-
straints on alienation-invalidating contractual restraints as well as
power restraints. 42 The Minderhout court avoided a rule that would
have declared all reasonable restraints valid-that would have been too
great a change43 -and instead treated the promise not to transfer as a
condition precedent. Although the transfer of the land was presumably
permissible, because the prohibition was void, it nevertheless brought
the acceleration clause (a "reasonable" restraint) into operation.
On a more practical level, commercial use of anti-lien agreements
was widespread, and institutional lenders expected to be able to enforce
their rights notwithstanding the transfer of the "encumbered" prop-
erty. These commercial expectations had to be balanced against the
interests of debtors and strangers to the original transaction, and the
equitable lien approach was an attractive solution to the court.
It would seem that the California Supreme Court attempted the
impossible: preventing the use of anti-lien agreements in the future
while providing a remedy in cases of past use. The court apparently
utilized a vague rule to encourage compromises and to work out solu-
tions in light of the particular evidence in cases that would eventually
reach the courts.44 The lien analysis was to be a temporary salvage
device to prevent hardship by giving an option not to the debtor but
to the court. The court also implied that it might recognize the validity
of the contractual provision prohibiting transfer or encumbrance of
property if no allegation of an equitable lien were raised.45
The primary contribution of the Minderhout decision is that it marks
the beginning of a new doctrine of restraint on alienation in Cali-
fornia,46 an innovation that will outlive the concept of an equitable
mortgage created by a negative covenant. But much confusion has
42 See the cases cited in Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 32 Cal. Rptr. 584, 586 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963). The proposed anti-lien interest is a power restraint. The prohibition on
transfer and further encumbrance has an in rem effect; prohibited transactions are not
merely breaches of contract, they are void.
43 This technique of gradual change to signal an area of transition is not uncommon
in opinions of Justice Traynor, who wrote the Minderhout opinion. See Hetland, supra
note 22.
44 The determinative factor should be the actual understanding of the parties to the
litigation. For example, if the transferee had deducted the debt from the purchase price,
it might be proper to infer that the original debtor intended to give a Hen.
45 61 Cal. 2d at 314-15, 392 P.2d at 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
46 See La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1971) (although the restraint was held invalid); Lazzareschi Invest. Co. v. San
Francisco Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Cal. App. 3d 303, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417 (Ct. App. 1971);
Sanchez v. Centro Mexican of Sacramento, 1 Cal. App. 3d 756, 81 Cal. Rptr. 875 (Ct. App.
1969); Hellbaum v. Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9
(Ct. App. 1969).
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resulted from the fact that the transformation of the anti-lien into an
equitable lien was not limited to the special situation before the court.
C. From Lien to Contract?: Minderhout and Subsequent Cases
The California Supreme Court discussed the "negative mortgage"
again in 1971 in Tahoe National Bank v. Phillips.4 7 The defendant and
others borrowed money from the plaintiff bank to finance a real estate
development. The bank received a note, signed by all the borrowers,
and a Minderhout-type agreement, signed by the defendant and re-
corded, which provided that the defendant would not convey or en-
cumber her residential property 8 until the debt was paid. A few
months later, the defendant recorded a declaration of homestead on the
property.49 Upon default on the note, the bank foreclosed on the de-
fendant's land and introduced evidence at trial, without objection from
the defendant, to prove an intention to grant a security interest. The
trial court thought the evidence was sufficient and granted a decree of
foreclosure, but the California Supreme Court reversed, concluding
that the agreement was not reasonably susceptible of interpretation as a
mortgage.
It is impossible to distinguish Phillips from Minderhout on their
facts. The decisions seem to be in direct conflict since the intention to
create a security interest was established and supported in both cases by
sufficient evidence. 0
The majority opinion explained that these types of agreements were
used by banks with small, nominally unsecured loans. In Phillips, the
bank had chosen this form of agreement over the regular trust-deed
document. The contract, on the face of it, did not support an intention
to give a security interest; consequently, said the court, in accordance
with principles of interpretation for contracts of adhesion, the agree-
ment could not be interpreted as providing the bank with a security
interest. Parol evidence was therefore irrelevant and could not support
the trial court judgment. The court emphasized that a Minderhout-
type document could lead a borrower who refuses to give a mortgage
into believing he is not doing so and concluded: "Legal alchemy cannot
convert an assignment into an equitable mortgage, violating the cus-
47 4 Cal. 3d 11, 480 P.2d 320, 92 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1971).
48 The agreement did not apply to the property involved in the venture.
49 The court held that her act of recording a declaration of homestead did not consti-
tute a breach of her obligation not to encumber her land. 4 Cal. 3d at 21 n.14, 480 P.2d
at 328 n.14, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 712 n.14.
5r0 See Tahoe Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 4 Cal. 3d 11, 24, 480 P.2d 320, 330, 92 Cal. Rptr.
704, 714 (1971) (Sullivan, J., dissenting); Tahoe Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 2 Cal. App. 3d 221,
82 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Ct. App. 1970). But see 82 Cal. Rptr. at 597 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
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tomer's reasonable expectation and bestowing upon the bank the riches
of an hypothecation of title. '51
Although the court did not overrule Minderhout, it failed to explain
why legitimate construction in one case (Minderhout) should be con-
sidered "legal alchemy" in another (Phillips). After pointing out several
minor differences between the documents in the two cases, the court
explained the significant difference between Minderhout and Phillips:
in Minderhout, a breach had actually occurred. The court doubted that
specific performance would be granted to undo the transfer in such a
case52 and concluded that the only way to enforce the agreement in the
Minderhout situation would be to recognize the creation of a lien that
would permit an action against the transferee.53
The court seemed to be influenced by Professor Hetland's analysis.
As noted above, however, every decision against the transferee amounts
to indirect elimination of the debtor's option. The nature of the trans-
action should not depend on the type of defendant (original debtor or
transferee) who happens to appear before the court.
It can be argued that the policies underlying Minderhout seven years
earlier were actually implemented by the Phillips decision. Since the
loans associated with the "negative security" were usually small and of
short duration, past violations of prior Minderhout agreements should
have been taken care of by the time of the Phillips decision.5 4 The
court made it clear in Phillips that institutional lenders who had not
followed the suggestion in Minderhout to stop the "negative security"
practice altogether would not be able to assert in a case against the
original debtor that the anti-lien agreement was intended as an equi-
table lien; they were left with only contractual remedies. The court also
implied that banks might encounter difficulties in attempting to en-
force their "rights" against a transferee. Moreover, although the origi-
nal debtor's right to assert the existence of a lien was not expressly con-
sidered in Phillips, it will nevertheless be more difficult for him to
establish as a defense in a personal action that the negative covenant
was intended to provide the creditor with a security interest.
51 4 Cal. 3d at 20, 480 P.2d at 328, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
52 For its doubts about specific performance the court cited Minderhout; in that case,
however, the court manifested doubts mainly because it had found a lien. Had the lien
not been recognized, the way might have been open for this kind of relief. The court in
Phillips was well aware of this. See text and note at note 56 infra. Here again the distinc-
tions were unpersuasive.
53 4 Cal. 3d at 20, 480 P.2d at 828, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
54 The doctrine permitting reasonable restraints on alienations had by then reached
California. See cases cited at note 46 supra. It is important to note that the agreement in
Phillips was actually signed about a year after the Minderhout decision.
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The court's analysis of the terms of the Phillips agreement is incon-
sistent with the self-evident-security-interest interpretation suggeseted
by Professor Hetland. It is closer to the principle announced by Judge
McCourt years ago in Western States Finance Co. v. Ruff: only in
special circumstances will the words of a contract be charged with a
different meaning than they ordinarily and naturally possess. 5 The
Phillips decision also repeated the suggestion in Minderhout that the
courts may give effect to the contractual duties agreed upon by the
parties if the equitable lien theory is eliminated. The court said the
agreement:
provides in part that 'borrower will not create or permit any lien
or any encumbrance (other than those presently existing) to exist
on said real property . . without the prior written consent of
bank.' . . . [I]ts absolute prohibition on what would be junior
encumbrances is inappropriate in a mortgage, and if in fact such
a prohibition appeared in a mortgage it might be unlawful as
an unreasonable restraint upon alienation. [See Coast Bank v.
Minderhout.] On the other hand, as unsecured creditor the bank
would benefit greatly from an assurance that defendant would
not encumber her assets.56
Although the decision in Phillips was a move in the right directioi,
it did not guarantee an end to the confusion surrounding the anti-lien.
The analysis thus far has considered the anti-lien in "at least three
different factual contexts, each of which may be governed by different
rules of law.57 The court in Phillips emphasized that the plaintiff
was an institutional lender using a contract of adhesion. Should
there be another category in the analysis for cases in which a home-
made negative mortgage is involved? Given the sparse case history prior
to Minderhout, one would predict that the need for an additional cate-
gory was almost nonexistent. Nevertheless, a California court of appeal
faced that problem in Kaiser Industries Corp. v. Taylor,58 decided
shortly after Phillips.
Pursuant to an agreement with his lender, the defendant debtor
ordered a title company not to transfer or encumber his interest in land
55 108 Ore. 442, 454, 215 P. 501, 505 (1923). See text and note at note 11 supra.
56 Tahoe Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 4 Cal. 3d at 18-19, 480 P.2d at 326, 92 Cal. Rptr. at
710. See La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1971). Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on this statement, and it is
difficult to tell whether the court considered only contractual remedies or actually signaled
future acceptance of the anti-lien.
57 The three situations are: (1) creditor claims a lien in litigation with the original
debtor;, (2) debtor asserts the "one form of action" defense (the Hetland theory); (3) credi-
tor claims a lien in litigation with the transferee.
58 17 Cal. App. 3d 346, 94 Cal. Rptr. 773 (Ct. App. 1971).
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held by the title company without the lender's consent until the
promissory note had been paid in fall. The title company, in a letter
to the lender, acknowledged that it would act in accordance with the
debtor's instructions. Upon default, the lender sued on the note, and
the borrower raised the "one form of action" defense. The court held
Phillips inapplicable to cases involving private lenders and homemade
mortgages and relied instead on Minderhout to bar the action on the
note.
Although the result in Taylor was fair, the case differs from the nega-
tive mortgage cases considered above,59 and the court's failure to em-
ploy other analogies burdens California law with another category of
interests beyond the original scope of Minderhout. The interpretation
of the court of appeal that Minderhout establishes a general principle
limited in its application by Phillips differs from the view expressed in
this article that Phillips carried out the policies expressed in Minder-
hout.60 Taylor therefore proceeds in the direction of ex post facto,
obscure security interests. 61
The final case in this review of California law after Minderhout is
Browne v. San Luis Obispo National Bank,612 decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.63 Mrs. Browne signed a
Minderhout-type agreement that was promptly recorded by the bank.
One year later, Mrs. Browne filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy
listing the bank as an unsecured creditor and claiming a homestead
exemption from bankruptcy for the property covered by the agreement.
Nearly two years after the exemption was granted and Mrs. Browne was
discharged from all debts, the bank brought suit to foreclose, claiming
59 The debtor not only had promised not to transfer his rights, but had actually de-
prived himself of his power to do so, having caused the trust company to assume fiduciary
obligations toward his creditor. The situation was similar to pledging property by giving
notice to a bailee. Furthermore, the letter was written in negative form because it dealt
only with trust company duties.
60 See text following note 53 supra.
61 Just a few months later, another California court dealt with an anti-lien agreement
in a dispute between the creditor-lender and the subsequent purchaser of the land. Orange
County Teachers Credit Union v. Peppard, 21 Cal. App. 3d 448, 98 Cal. Rptr. 533 (Ct.
App. 1971). Although the case appeared to be in the Minderhout context, the court indi-
cated a disposition to apply Phillips. Ultimately, however, the decision for the defendant-
transferee rested on a want of sufficient evidence to prove the alleged intent to create a
security interest.
62 462 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1972).
63 The federal court applied California real estate law. The anti-lien seems not to have
been discussed in recent years by courts outside California. The only case that has been
found is an Arizona Court of Appeals decision, Kalmanoff v. Weitz, 8 Ariz. App. 171, 444
P2d 728 (1968), in which anti-lien provisions were found not to create an equitable lien.
In this case, however, the negative covenant was employed in a very peculiar way: pro-
tecting a real estate broker's exclusive right to obtain tenants.
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it had an equitable mortgage on the property. The court, citing
Phillips, decided that the homestead declaration did not constitute a
breach of the agreement and that the bank did not have an equitable
security interest: "Given [Phillips] and the lack of any evidence that
Mrs. Browne intended to create a security interest [citing Coast Bank
v. Minderhout], there can be no doubt that the Bank never obtained
any mortgage or lien."64
The court in Browne, like the court in Taylor, was trying to har-
monize the decisions in Minderhout and Phillips. These attempts are
undesirable and unnecessary. Minderhout contained not only a rule
of law, but also the seeds of change; viewed dynamically, Phillips
fulfilled Minderhout by replacing the equitable lien theory with con-
tractual remedies against the debtor. Despite lower court misunder-
standing, Phillips thus tends to bring California's law back into the
national mainstream. Outside California a contract that prohibits the
sale or encumbrance of the debtor's land until the debt is discharged is
probably valid. 5 The creditor may therefore enforce his rights by
obtaining an injunction or accelerating the debt (if the agreement so
provides).
At the same time, however, the decline of the equitable lien approach
of Minderhout leaves a gap in American law; in California, as else-
where, if the creditor has neither a lien nor other interest in his debtor's
land, he has no rights against a purchaser from the debtor or a subse-
quent mortgagee. The civil wrong of "causing a breach of contract,"
which otherwise provides some protection against a third party, is
traditionally inapplicable to situations of this kind,66 and indeed, there
are good reasons not to extend it that far.67
Furthermore, it would be difficult for the creditor to prove the pur-
chaser's prior knowledge of the negative agreement. If the contract does
84 462 F.2d at 133. This statement contradicts Phillips. There the court ruled cate-
gorically that evidence could not be introduced to prove an intention to create a security
interest. Tahoe Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 4 Cal. 3d 11, 17, 480 P.2d 320, 325, 92 Cal. Rptr.
704, 709 (1971).
65 See Knott v. Shepherdstown Mfg. Co., 30 W. Va. 790, 5 S.E. 266 (1888); Western
States Finance Co. v. Ruff, 108 Ore. 442, 215 P. 501 (1923); 2 G. GiLMoRE, supra note 1,
§ 38.4. See also Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 11 F. Supp. 497, 513 (S.D.N.Y.
1935), remanded, 85 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1936) (discussed at note 16 supra).
66 2 G. GiWmoRE, supra note 1, § 38.4.
67 Usually the vendor, not the vendee, takes the initiative to sell the land, and accep-
tance of the offer should not create a tort liability. "One does not induce another to
commit a breach of contract ... when he merely enters into an agreement with the other
with knowledge that the other cannot perform both it and his contract with the third
person." 4 RpsrATEmENT OF TORTS § 766(i) (1939). Although the rule has been criticized,
see Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HAv. L. RIv. 888, 965 (1964), it has
remained unchanged. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs § 766(n) (rent. Draft No. 14, 1969);
W. PRossR, THE LAw OF TORTS § 129, at 934 (4th ed. 1971).
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not create an interest in land, its recordation is unauthorized; 68 thus,
constructive notice will not be established even if it is recorded.
69
Even if a vigilant purchaser acquires actual notice between the date
the contract is signed and the date scheduled for closing, the contract
will not be retroactively "tainted" with the purchaser's knowledge. The
equitable interest he has purchased is undoubtedly valid, and com-
pletion of the transaction is privileged as an action taken to protect
acquired rights;70 otherwise the purchaser would be under a duty to
rescind a lawful contract. The failure to take such positive action has
not traditionally constituted a tort for causing a breach of contract, and
it is questionable whether the tort action should be extended, at the
expense of commercial certainty, to cover the failure to cancel a lawful
contract.71
The contract theory of Phillips will probably replace the equitable
lien theory of Minderhout, leaving the anti-lien creditor without
remedies against strangers to the initial anti-lien agreement. The
question that remains is whether the anti-lien interest could (and
should) afford protection unavailable under other theories.
II. THE ANT-LIEN INTEREST
A. The Nature of the Anti-Lien Interest
The distinction between secured and unsecured interests, although
not always easy to draw, is a necessary one since several rules 'of law
68 See 6 R. POWELL, TiE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 914, at 279 (1968); 4 AMEMCAN
LAW or PROPERTY § 17.8 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
69 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 68, § 17.17, at 589-90.
70 W. PRossER, supra note 67, § 129, at 944. If completion of the transaction, in the
circumstances described in the text, creates tortious liability, the transferee cannot win
indemnification for the damages he pays to the vendor's creditor. By definition, his own
voluntary act made him liable, and the seller cannot be held responsible. Partial indemni-
fication, based on a theory of joint tortfeasors, would probably not be available either.
The seller's liability stemming from his original promise is a contractual one and is not
based on any theory of tort. Also, it would be odd to hold the seller liable in tort for co-
operating (by encouragement, request, ratification, or the like) in the buyer's wrongful
act. Such cooperation would amount to the seller's persuading himself to break the
original contract and could not coexist with the purchaser's liability. Furthermore, the
law does not recognize a tort of causing the causation of breach of contract.
Theories of unjust enrichment are also not applicable here; after all, the transferor
received no more than his money's worth for the property. Even a provision in the (second)
contract that secures a marketable title may not help the purchaser. This warranty may
be inapplicable (if not waived) since the interest conveyed might have no flaw. Cf. text
and note at note 10 supra. (For the definition of marketable title, see 4 AMERCAN LAw OF
PROPERTY, supra note 68, § 18.8, at 673). This potential remedy also presupposes the power
to rescind the second contract.
71 Besides the problems of establishing liability, the plaintiff may face difficulties in
proving his damages; for example, the transaction may have saved the debtor from
bankruptcy.
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apply only to secured interests-interests that provide priority in bank-
ruptcy and a right to foreclose on specific property. The law has always
assumed a dichotomy, so that "hybrid creatures" have to be categorized.
The issue thus becomes one of characterizing an interest that is de-
signed to secure the payment of a debt but does not possess the two
features of traditional secured interests.
The anti-lien interest is not a "disguised security interest." The
relationships between the parties are accurately described; the debtor's
payments are not described as rents, compensation for options to re-
purchase, installments for title to be transferred, or the like. The only
effect of the agreement is a deprivation of the debtor's power to transfer
his land or encumber it while the debt is outstanding, without the
consent of the anti-lien creditor. Except for these preventive powers,
the creditor is like other unsecured creditors. In the event of bank-
ruptcy, he shares (pro rata) in the assets (if any) that remain for dis-
tribution among unsecured creditors; upon default, he must rely on
the ordinary execution-of-judgment procedures. The conveyance of an
anti-lien interest is thus not designed to put the property beyond the
reach of the trustee in bankruptcy; the interest cannot even be sold to
satisfy the debt.7 2
Although the anti-lien interest is therefore not the equivalent of a
lien, the two interests do bear some resemblance to each other. This
section of the paper will explore the precise characteristics of the anti-
lien interest and further analyze its points of similarity to an ordinary
lien. Two complementary kinds of situations will be considered: first,
those in which the debtor abides by the covenant; and second, those in
which he breaches it.
1. Protection When the Debtor Respects the Covenant. The anti-
lien creditor gains several advantages by preventing the debtor from
transferring and encumbering his title. In the first place, the debtor
cannot lawfully sell his land, possibly his most valuable asset, and leave
72 In certain situations, the ownership of this negative right could be a valuable eco-
nomic asset-for example, an anti-lien prohibiting the transfer of a lot that is important
to a developer or to a neighboring, expanding factory. But this right cannot be separated
from the lender-borrower relationship and sold to a third party. The reason is obvious:
the covenant expires, according to its terms, when the debt is paid. If unrelated to the
payment of the debt, it would dearly be a void restraint on alienation. See note 78 infra.
But it should be possible for the creditor to transfer the negative obligation in conjunc-
tion with an assignment-of the debt.
An easement may be designed to have the same effect-for instance, a right of way or a
profit that is intended to prevent construction on an expensive lot zoned for high rises,
and that can be extinguished only upon payment of the debt. Normally, however, this
easement is a disguised interest calculated to survive the debtor's bankruptcy; it is highly
vulnerable to various legal attacks.
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the jurisdiction with the proceeds. The anti-lien creditor also has the
power to prevent new loans to the debtor secured by mortgages on the
land, thus assuring additional assets for himself and other unsecured
creditors in case of bankruptcy. A debtor who is eager to transfer his
land or obtain additional credit secured by a lien has available only
two courses of action: he can prepay the debt 73 or negotiate with the
anti-lien creditor for permission to complete the transaction. In the
latter case, the anti-lien creditor will probably demand a "true" security
interest or another assurance for the full payment of the debt.
On the other hand, the anti-lien interest can be defeated in several
situations. The anti-lien provides no protection in bankruptcy, and it
fails to prevent both foreclosures by mortgagees who have obtained their
security interest prior to the anti-lien loan, and execution sales initiated
by judgment creditors.7 4 A judgment creditor will have priority over the
anti-lien creditor,75 who will rarely be able to protect his interests under
73 The reference in the text is to contracts that specifically provide that the debtor, at
his option, may prepay his debt, with or without (reasonable) prepayment penalties. When
there is no such provision, the debtor cannot compel his creditor to accept money that
is not yet due. 60 AM. JuR. 2d Payment § 8 (1972). Under these circumstances, the creditor
might attempt to apply pressures in order to realize windfall gains through, for example,
exorbitant prepayment penalties. But then the anti-lien would probably be declared void
as an unreasonable restraint on alienation, leaving the creditor unable to prevent or
cancel the transfer.
The Minderhout agreement itself contained no prepayment clanse, and thus could fail
to qualify as creating a valid anti-lien interest.
74 See Fisher v. Safe Harbor Realty Co., 38 Del. Ch. 297, 150 A.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
With the exception of spendthrift trusts, 30 AM. JUR. 2d Executions § 163 (1967), valid
restraints on alienation do not prevent execution sales. 6 AMmEIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
supra note 68, § 26.35. The judgment creditor's interests are sometimes preferred even
over the interests of strangers to the transactions. Thus, tenant's rights are subject to an
involuntary sale notwithstanding an explicit prohibition of transfer in the lease. 2 R.
POWELL, supra note 68, 246.1, at 372-84; 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 33, at 86-7
(1968). The same rule applies to trust property and judicial sales. 47 AM. JUR. 2d judicial
Sales § 6 (1969). And finally, the rule applies to shares in a close corporation, even where
the judgment creditor or purchaser could not have become a shareholder by a voluntary
transaction. See, e.g., Street v. Sugerman, 202 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1967), where the court
ordered the execution sale of shares in a law corporation owned by attorneys. The result
in Street rested on statutory interpretation, but the policy is quite sound.
Had the opposite view been adopted, the anti-lien beneficiary would actually have
a lien; or he might cause the unsecured creditors to petition for declaration of the
debtor's bankruptcy (if the land was the only asset available). It is of interest to note that
the late nineteenth century New York cases dealing with after-acquired property clauses
in chattel mortgages reached somewhat similar results: the lien was held effective against
a subsequent purchaser but ineffective against an execution creditor. See I G. GMnvioRE,
supra note 1, § 2.4, at 37. This rule differs from the proper anti-lien rule, however, in
both reasoning and result. In the after-acquired property clause situation, only the mort-
gagee would benefit from asserting his right.
75 The general rule is that a judgment regularly entered or docketed has priority as a
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these circumstances.76 Furthermore, unlike the situation with regular
security interests 7 7 the purchaser of the land will probably not be
subject to the negative restrictions that had bound the original debtor.78
Thus, the anti-lien interest clearly differs from a lien. The advantages
of the anti-lien are contingent on certain conditions, such as the
debtor's need for additional credit. Moreover, these advantages, unlike
ordinary secured interests, are not geared to the moment of default;
thus, when the debtor does default, it may be too late for the anti-lien
lien over subsequent judgments against the same defendant. 46 Am. Jun. 2d Judgments
§ 283 (1969).
76 He has several possible escape routes. (a) The parties may agree that an execu-
tion sale of the land will accelerate the debt. Such an agreement would apparently be
valid. The debtor would then probably try to turn over other assets to satisfy the judg-
ment debt. (In some jurisdictions the debtor has the right to decide which of his assets
will be subject to an execution sale. 30 A&. JuR. 2d Executions § 92 (1967). In any event,
the sheriff would probably use his discretion to order that the judgment debt be satisfied
from unencumbered property first.)
(b) The doctrine of marshalling assets will probably apply. "[The two-funds rule] is
founded on the principle of natural justice, that a man shall not exercise the right
which he possesses so as to injure the right of another, if he can fully enjoy his own
right without such injury to another." Keaton v. Miller, 38 Miss. 630, 635 (1860). The
doctrine was applied against a judgment lienor (protecting a junior judgment creditor)
in Boone v. Clark, 129 I1. 466, 21 N.E. 850 (1889).
(c) If the judgment was obtained to defraud the anti-lien creditor, he could attack it.
See generally REsATEmENT OF JUDGMENTS § 90, comment c (1942).
77 'The general rule is that an execution purchaser takes the property purchased
subject to a prior mortgage, even if the sale is of the entire property without any mention
of the mortgage." 30 Ams. JUR. 2d Executions § 447 (1967).
78 Various arguments based on analogous situations might be offered against this
result. Since the anti-lien is basically a property interest, one might argue, it should
survive an execution sale, like a lien or an easement. Furthermore, a purchaser of shares
or a term of years at an execution sale does not acquire more rights than the judgment
debtor had. The law allows a temporary suspension of the other shareholders' or
the lessor's rights to facilitate the sale, but thereafter the purchaser has the same rights
as his predecessor in title.
These arguments overlook important differences between a lien and an anti-lien.
As maintained earlier (note 72 supra), the anti-lien should not be recognized if separated
from the debt it secures. Unlike a lien, the negative interest does not enable a creditor
to trigger foreclosure proceedings. If title is legally transferred, the restriction is no
longer capable of tying up an asset that will afford protection in case of default. Moreover,
the creditor could not obtain a personal judgment against the purchaser (unless the pur-
chaser guaranteed the debt). The interest thus ceases to be related to the debt. To say
that the purchaser could not sell his land until the debtor had paid off his debt would
be to sanction a plainly unreasonable restraint on alienation.
If upheld, the restriction would create an intolerable "patience game." If the new
owner wanted to sell his property for some reason before the debtor was declared bank-
rupt (at which time the discharge of the debt would automatically extinguish the re-
striction), he would have to pay the debt and might not be able to recover from the
debtor. Moreover, if we were to allow the creditor to sue when the restriction was violated,
he would be hard put to explain which of his interests was harmed, other than his right
to apply pressure to force someone to assume the obligation of a stranger.
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creditor to exercise his pressures. The anti-lien encourages early pay-
ment in many cases, but it fails to guarantee full payment.
2. Protection When the Debtor Breaches the Covenant. If the anti-
lien debtor transfers or encumbers his land, in violation of his agree-
ment, the creditor has ample remedies. Assuming that the anti-lien
interest operates like a disabling restraint,7 9 the debtor will have no
power of transfer, and a prohibited transaction will convey no interest
in the land. The anti-lien creditor will thus be able to treat the "trans-
ferred" property as an asset of the debtor, even though the transferee
claims title. The unsecured creditors 0 will therefore benefit when they
put the "transferred" property to an execution sale, or when the trustee
in bankruptcy obtains title to the "conveyed" land.8'
The anti-lien does differ from a disabling restraint in several respects.
It fails to afford protection against involuntary transfers,8 2 and it per-
mits the landowner to regain his powers of alienation whenever he
79 A disabling restraint "is a provision which withholds from the conveyee the power
to make a transfer." 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 68, § 26.2, at 412. See also
REsTATEmENT OF PROPERTY, §§ 404(l)(a), (2) (1944); note 118 infra.
80 Strictly speaking, the debtor would not have violated the rights of the other un-
secured creditors, and it may seem strange that the assertion of jus tertii could improve
their rights. It could be argued that the anti-lien should provide only a "relative" property
interest, so that the transfer would be void only vis-bA-vis the "secured" creditor. Cf. A.
KOCouREK, JuRAL RELATIONS 118 (1927). In this author's view, the limited voidness ap-
proach should be rejected. The concept has never been recognized; it is not in harmony
with the characteristics of the anti-lien and operates (after the transfer) like a lien.
81 When a disabling restraint is valid, the trustee in bankruptcy can claim title to the
land, see 9 AM. JuL 2d Bankruptcy § 1127 (1963), because no "equitable interest" is vested
in the transferee. The anti-lien is similar in this respect to an unauthorized sale by an
agent prior to ratification, but differs from escrow transactions in which the vendor has
the legal power to convey. (Only upon restoration of the transferor's power are certain
remedies available to the transferee. See text and note at note 85 infra.)
82 See text and note at note 74 supra (execution sale). The anti-lien likewise would
not prevent inheritance of the property by the laws of intestacy. Since the heirs are
responsible for the debt, the interest will not extinguish mortis causa-which is not true
when title is transferred by an execution sale. See text and note at note 78 supra.
Could the anti-lien restrict testamentary dispositions if the financing instrument spe-
cifically indicated an intention to do so? The answer is not clear. In a somewhat different
context, courts have held that an agreement not to make a will is valid. Foman v. Davis,
315 F.2d 254, 255-56 (Ist Cir. 1963); Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 370, 372 (1953). The creditor
may have a legitimate interest in preventing such dispositions, since the testator might
attempt to distinguish in his will between liability for the debt and ownership of the land.
If the courts enforce an anti-Hen agreement which contains a provision like the one
just described, perhaps the person taking the land under the laws of intestacy should be
considered a trustee. He would hold the land for the beneficiary mentioned in the will
until the debt has been paid. If this proposition is correct, the grantee would probably
be able to pay the debt himself (see text and note at note 87 infra), obtain an interest in
the land, and recover payment of the debt from the new debtor designated in the will.
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wishes, simply by prepaying the debt.83 Furthermore, since the debtor-
transferor can extinguish the anti-lien, and indeed is under an obliga-
tion to do so,8 - neither he nor his heirs can question the validity of a
conveyance, even if the transfer is concluded prior to payment of the
debt and without the consent of the creditor. Upon the termination of
the anti-lien restriction, the transferee can enforce or protect his interest
in the land. 5
The courts have reached a similar result in the "after-acquired
property" line of cases. Although decisions vary as to whether the
purchaser obtains legal title, equitable ownership, or protections under
the doctrine of estoppel by deed, it is a well settled rule that he acquires
certain rights from the date the transferor obtains title that can be
properly described as an interest in land.86 Similarly, in the anti-lien
situation, the expectancy of obtaining an interest in land upon pay-
ment of the debt should justify permitting the transferee to pay the
debt and thus "redeem" the land.
8 7
If courts were to compare the anti-lien to an equitable servitude
(a promissory restraint enforced by a court of equity) rather than to a
disabling restraint, the prohibited transfer would be voidable only at
the option of the creditor, who could sue to revest title with the trans-
feror.88 If the anti-lien creditor exercised his option, the equitable
servitude and disabling restraint approaches would produce the same
results; for example, the creditor could satisfy a judgment debt from the
transferred land, or the bankruptcy trustee could use the anti-lien for
the advantage of all unsecured creditors.8 9 But if the anti-lien creditor
did not enforce his right to set aside the transfer, the other unsecured
creditors would be unable to put the land to an execution sale. More-
over, the creditors of the transferee could prevent such a sale by first
satisfying their judgment debt from the land. Certain difficulties that
83 Cf. note 73 supra. Full payment of the debt, when the creditor is obliged to accept,
brings the restraint to an end. Cf. G. OSBORNE, supra note 10, at § 293. Without the
existence of a debt, the restriction would be a void restraint on alienation. See text and
note at note 78 supra.
84 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 68, § 15.20.
85 See M'Wiliams v. Nisly, 2 S. & R. 507 (Pa. 1816) (extinction of disabling restraint);
6 AMEmC AN LAW Or PROPERTY, supra note 68, § 26.84.
86 See 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 68, §§ 15.18-15.24; G. OSBORNE, supra
note 10, §§ 37-41.
87 Cf. G. OSBORNE, supra note 10, § 304, dealing, however, with cases in which the
payor already had an interest in the mortgaged land.
88 Cf. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 68, § 26.34, at 461.
89 Bankruptcy Act § 70(e). 11 U.S.C. § 110(e)(1)-(2) (1970), construed in Moore v. Bay,
284 U.S. 4 (1935). It is assumed that the anti-lien creditor would be treated like a general
creditor in this context.
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exist under the disabling restraint theory would be nonexistent under
the equitable servitude explanation; but the latter interpretation would
cause the interest to be much more uncertain and vulnerable to various
defenses.
Nevertheless, whichever approach ultimately emerges,90 the trans-
feree would be well advised to prepay the debt immediately to avoid
the serious side effects of the anti-lien.
Whether the anti-lien is a security interest is not a question of
semantics and should not be determined by the mechanical application
of an a priori definition.91 In a sense, the anti-lien interest is a "security
interest;" it is a property interest given to secure a debt and has some
features similar to mortgages and liens. But there are also substantial
differences between the anti-lien interest and traditional security in-
terests; a lender who agrees to be treated as an unsecured creditor in
bankruptcy proceedings cannot be described as having an interest
similar to a mortgagee or a creditor with a lien.
The difficulty in categorizing the anti-lien interest as either a secured
or unsecured interest is due to the fact that the anti-lien does not fall
within an established conceptual framework, but is a different concept.
Courts will therefore have to decide afresh, for each individual situa-
tion, whether a particular rule governing security interests should also
apply to the anti-lien interest.92
B. Is the Anti-Lien Needed?
The discussion thus far has analyzed the nature of the anti-lien. The
obvious question to consider at this point is whether this device is
useful; there is no reason to advocate legal innovations that ultimately
will not be used.
90 See also text and notes at notes 143-60 infra.
91 UNIFoR ComwERCIAL CODE § 1-201(37), for example, defines "security interest" as an
"interest in... property ... which secures payment.. . of an obligation." On its face,
the definition includes the anti-lien (except that the Code does not deal with real estate
security interests, see id. § 9-1040)). There are, however, substantial differences in the
methods by which the anti-lien and regular security interests secure payment of an obliga-
tion. Article 9 emphasizes the concept of priorities; this concept is irrelevant to the anti-
lien situation, where the security does not "secure" in the sense contemplated by the
drafters of the Code. See 2 P. COOGAN et al., supra note 22, § 23.10[l], implying that an
anti-lien is not a security interest. Professor Gilmore raises the same question, 1 G.
GiLMoRt, supra note 1, § 11.1, at 333-37, but does not answer it, probably because he
rejects the conclusion that a negative covenant creates an interest in land, 2 id. § 38.4, at
1017, or in personal property, id. § 38.5, at 1018-19.
92 In some cases, the same rules should apply to both liens and anti-liens-for example,
rules concerning requirements for the creation of the interest. In other cases, rules that
deal with security interests in land would be inapplicable to the anti-lien-for example,
foreclosure proceedings.
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The anti-lien interest is far from perfect. In some cases, it gives too
little security-it extinguishes at an execution sale; in others, it gives
too much-transfers will probably be cancelled to benefit all creditors
in bankruptcy. The pressures for prepayment that it may engender and
the inevitable initial uncertainties concerning its application also mili-
tate against this proposal. The advantages of the anti-lien must be
assessed against this background.
This section of the paper will consider the advantages of the anti-lien
interest in three contexts: (1) situations in which a traditional security
interest is unavailable; (2) jurisdictions with a "one form of action"
rule; and (3) jurisdictions with a "two forms of action" rule.
1. A Traditional Security Interest is Unavailable. There are situa-
tions in commercial life in which no security interest can be given.
First, no-security-interest obligations may be imposed by contract. The
terms of a lease, for example, may preclude a lessee from using his
interest as collateral for a debt. The lessor's reasons for insisting on such
a promise are apparent. But an anti-lien would leave the lessor no worse
off than if the debtor obtained an unsecured loan. At the same time, the
negative covenant would provide obvious advantages to the anti-lien
creditor.93
Second, some lenders are prohibited by statute from lending against
a junior lien.94 These lenders might well prefer to be secured by an
anti-lien interest if the alternative is no security interest at all. If the
legal analysis in this paper is correct, no title insurance policy would be
issued to cover a transaction that violates the anti-lien. Consequently, a
third party (a purchaser or mortgagee) would probably not invest
money in the land that secures the debt. Furthermore, the credit ex-
tended by the anti-lien creditor, when added to existing lien debts,
would probably be less than the value of the propetry, thus leaving the
debtor a margin of owner equity-an incentive not to desert his prop-
erty and move away. The anti-lien, by securing to some extent the avail-
ability upon default of both the defendant and his assets, improves the
chances that collection proceedings will not be futile.
The anti-lien also offers advantages in predefault situations. Realisti-
93 Even if the lessee subsequently obtains his landowner's consent to grant a security
interest to another lender, he will not be able to prefer the latter creditor over the former.
94 See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 1227, 1542 (West Supp. 1974). Although the courts have
not encountered the practice, national banking associations in various parts of the
country have occasionally used Minderhout-type negative covenants. The main explana-
tion is that 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1970) prevents them from lending against a junior lien.
Actually, it is unclear whether an anti-lien loan would be a "real estate loan" within the
meaning of section 371.
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cally, two important social phenomena will lead a substantial number
of debtors to negotiate with their creditor before amortization of the
debt. First, the high mobility rate of the American people 5 suggests
that many anti-lien borrowers will seek new places of residence during
the loan term. Second, many owners attempt to use regained land
equity to acquire financing even before secured debts are paid in full.96
In particular, a debtor who faces financial difficulties will commonly try
to raise credit on his equity or sell his propery to meet his obligations.97
Under these circumstances, the anti-lien creditor has an important
supervisory and enforcement mechanism with which to protect his
interests. He might insist on prepayment before the debtor's financial
position is further eroded or agree to the proposed transaction only at
the price of additional assurances for himself-for example, a guaranty
by the would-be assignee, protected by a new anti-lien.
The anti-lien interest thus aids collection of the debt without signifi-
cant expense, assures the lender of a virtual first priority position, and,
if the creditor agrees to a transfer of the property notwithstanding his
anti-lien interest, provides an opportunity to protect his rights with
additional assurances.
2. "One Form of Action" Jurisdictions. In several states, such as
California,98 the right to collect a debt secured by a mortgage can be
enforced only by an action to foreclose, after which a judgment for a
deficiency may be obtained.99 The anti-lien offers potential advantages
to a lender who would otherwise acquire a junior lien in a "one form of
action" jurisdiction.
Assume, for example, that a first mortgage of $30,000 and a second
mortgage of $5,000 are outstanding on a home with an estimated value
of $40,000. If the debtor defaults, the second mortgagee must foreclose
if he intends to collect the debt. If the first mortgagee also forecloses,
the second mortgagee, assuming he decides to bid,100 must pay at least
95 Between 1965 and 1970, 47 percent of the American population changed place of
residence at least once. I U.S. Dm'T oF COMMER E, BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, Soc. & EcoN.
STATISrCS ADmIN., CHARAcrmSxcs OF THE POPuLAON, pt. 1, § 1, Table 72, at 1-365 (U.S.
Summary 1972). It is important to note, however, that homeowners are substantially less
prone to move than nonowners. See J. LANSING & E. MuULI.Ea, THE GEOGRAPmC MOBILrrY
OF LABOR 151-59 (1967).
90 The existence of a large second mortgage industry in the United States is evidence
of this observation.
97 This assumption might be buttressed by the fact that about 75 percent of all
straight bankruptcies are no asset cases. V. CouNTR.mN & A. KAuFxAN, COmmERCILL LAw:
CASES AND MATERIALS 170 (1971).
98 See CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1974).
99 G. OSBORNE, supra note 10, § 334.
100 99.3 percent of the parcels of land that are transferred through judicial sales are
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$30,000. If he purchases the property, he then faces several potential
financial burdens: he may have to hold the property during the entire
statutory redemption period (generally one year'01) and thus lose the use
of at least $35,000 in his lending operations during that time; the in-
come from the property during the period may not cover maintenance
costs; and at the expiration of the waiting period, there may be addi-
tional expenses, such as brokerage fees, before the property is finally
sold. When legal expenses are considered, 102 the total collection costs
can prove to be prohibitive.
On the other hand, if the second mortgagee decides not to bid, he
may not have the right to a deficiency judgment; California law limits
the deficiency judgment to the amount by which the outstanding in-
debtedness exceeds the fair market value of the property, even if the
execution sale nets less than the fair market value. 03 The creditor can
overcome the redemption period restriction only if he has a power of
private sale-which is accompanied, however, with a loss of the right
to a deficiency judgment. 0 4
Since foreclosure expenses are a significant proportion of the junior
loan, it is bothersome to have to use the foreclosure procedure, espe-
cially where the debtor has other assets that could satisfy a small debt.
The problem created by foreclosure of a senior lien is even more
troublesome, since the junior lienor must invest several times the
amount of the initial loan if he wants to protect his interest. Although
the junior lienor can let his security interest disappear through a
senior lien foreclosure and then file a personal action,10 5 his chances of
collecting the debt then diminish. If the creditor does not enforce his
purchased by mortgagees. Prather, A Realistic Approach to Foreclosure, 14 Bus. LAw. 132,
135 (1958).
101 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 702 (West Supp. 1974).
102 See generally ABA Committee on Real Estate Financing, Cost and Time Factors
in Foreclosure of Mortgages, 3 REAL PROP. PROBATE & TRUST J. 413, table at 414 (1968).
103 CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE §§ 580a, 726 (West Supp. 1974).
The shortcoming of another alternative that may be available, maintaining the pay-
ments on the first mortgage and foreclosing on the second, are likewise apparent.
A foreclosure action followed by the fair market value determination is certainly
an awkward and expensive way of collecting a small debt, but no more probably than
acquiring encumbered property and making additional investment in it during the
statutory year of redemption. How much better a simple action on the note would
have been.
Hetland, supra note 22, at 169.
104 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 580d (West 1955).
105 Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 53 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963).
(There has been one notorious exception. See Spangler v. Memel, 7 Cal. 3d 603, 498 P.2d
1055, 101 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1972).) The "fair market value" limitation is inapplicable in
such a case.
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rights promptly, the financial situation of the debtor may deteriorate,
or he may leave the jurisdiction. 106
Even when a junior lien is merely an additional security for an
Article 9 creditor, it can cause mischief. In certain cases, the creditor
loses the right to a deficiency judgment; in all other cases, he can claim
it only after foreclosing on both the personal property and the real
estate collateral. 07
This situation suggests the need for an alternative to the second
mortgage. The anti-lien creditor's right to bring a simple action (since
there is no collateral to foreclose on) and the additional advantages of
the anti-lien 08 justify serious consideration of the anti-lien alterna-
tive. Indeed, the fact that negative covenants have been widely used in
California supports that conclusion.
Although second mortgages do have some advantages over the anti-
lien, it is important to avoid overestimating the practical importance of
these advantages. Second mortgages can be wiped out by first mortgages
when the latter contain future-advance clauses or terminate in fore-
closure and sale at a low price. Moreover, bankruptcies are infrequent
in this country, 09 and when they do occur even secured creditors may
100 Between 1965 and 1970, 4,139,000 Californians, or 22.5 percent of the population,
moved out of county, state, or country. Dauer & Gilhool, The Economics of Constitu-
tionalized Repossession: A Critique for Professor Johnson and a Partial Reply, 47 S. CAL.
L. REV. 116, 188 n.7 (1973).
107 Walker v. Community Bank, 10 Cal. 3d 729, 508 P.2d 329, 111 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974).
108 The particularly high mobility rate in California adds to the attractiveness of the
anti-lien. Between the years 1965 and 1970, more than 56 percent of the California popu-
lation changed residence at least once. I U.S. DF"'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
Soc. & ECON. STATISICS ADMIN., CH ACraIsTIcs OF THE POPULATION, pt. 6, § 1, Table 45,
at 6-382 (Cal. Summary 1972). See also note 106 supra.
109 There were thirty-eight personal bankruptcies per one hundred thousand popula-
tion in the United States in fiscal year 1957; seventy-two in 1962; ninety-eight in 1967;
and eighty-five in 1969. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM
29 (1971). Although it might be more fruitful to compare the amount of debt discharged
in bankruptcy to the total amount of credit outstanding in each year, the appropriate
figures are unavailable.
It might be argued that present bankruptcy rates are not a good indicator of the rates
that would prevail if the anti-Hen were widely adopted, because secured transactions
serve an important function in holding down the rate of bankruptcies. The practice of
lending money against a security interest regulates the ratio of credit to assets and thus
prevents debtors from overreaching themselves. It could be contended that the anti-lien
alternative will foster excessive borrowing, and thus increase the rate of bankruptcies.
For three reasons, however, the anti-lien will probably not upset the balance. First,
the anti-lien will have little effect on the first' mortgage industry; these lenders will have
no incentive to use it. Second, the anti-lien can be recorded, and potential subsequent
lenders will shy away from debtors bound by it. Third, one anti-lien may by its own
terms prevent the imposition of another, since it suspends the debtor's power to grant
interests in land, and the negative covenant is such an interest.
1974]
The University of Chicago Law Review
lose the benefits of their priority. These facts should also be assessed
in light of the prospect that an anti-lien will be helpful in collecting
the debt before bankruptcy-although the weight this consideration
should carry is presently only speculative.
Since the "in terrorem" effect of a lien can be achieved by the judg-
ment lien option that is available to the anti-lien creditor, the major
disadvantage of the anti-lien, compared to a second lien, is that it risks
defeat by the judgment lien of another creditor. If an acceleration
clause is included in the anti-lien agreement (a reasonable safeguard
since the judgment lien might extinguish the security interest), the
danger is actually confined to the possibility that a single action will
totally wipe out the owner's equity in a way that would prevent any
later collection from the debtor. What is the probability that there will
be no default on the payments of the loan, that the debtor will not
attempt to sell or mortgage the property, and that the judgment lien
debt will still be unpaid before its execution? Probably about the level
of the present bankruptcy rates.
3. "Two Forms of Action" Jurisdictions. Although the foregoing
analysis has emphasized the utility of the anti-lien interest in a "one
form of action" jurisdiction like California, it highlights the considera-
tions that could reasonably prompt lenders in "two forms of action"
jurisdictions to use the anti-lien in their small loan business. When
default occurs in a "two forms of action" jurisdiction, a creditor secured
by a lien has a choice of remedies: he can foreclose on the property or
sue the debtor personally on the note. 10 But in order to assure an effec-
tive foreclosure option, the creditor must take certain precautionary
measures in advance. He must insist on a margin of owner equity suffi-
cient to cover the costs of foreclosure (including the'effect of redemp-
tion periods and antideficiency legislation). If the equity is insufficient,
the creditor may well turn down the borrower's request.
If the creditor grants the loan, he will have to depend on his junior
lien as a threatening device and a protection in the event of the bank-
ruptcy of the debtor. In these borderline cases, the choice between the
"two forms of action" is practically illusory. If the costs of foreclosure
are high, the loan small, the deficiency judgment limited by fair market
value provisions, and the owner's equity insubstantial, the creditor
would naturally rely on a personal action to enforce his rights. He
might have been just as well off, or better off, if he had given up his
priority in exchange for control over the land and protection for the
efficacy of his personal action. Where mobility rates are high and
110 G. OSBORNE, supra note 10, § 333, at 698-99.
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bankruptcy rates low, experimentation with the anti-lien in these close
cases may prove to be the best solution.
The anti-lienor's option of passive enforcement should carry a special
appeal for creditors who are reluctant to initiate court proceedings.
Homeowners' associations, for example, derive their income through
assessments that are imposed by covenants and are levied on the mem-
bers' lots. When a lot owner defaults on his payments, suit rarely fol-
lows. The small amounts involved do not justify the expense of litiga-
tion; and the administrators, usually residents of the same community,
are hesitant to take such action against their neighbors."1 Experience
indicates that the arrears are most often collected when the land is
transferred,1 2 probably because purchasers are unwilling to buy prop-
erty encumbered with overdue debts. But if the transferee deducts the
amount of the debt from the purchase price and refuses to transfer it
to the association, the association's only remedy is foreclosure on its
lien,"3 an even more expensive procedure.
It would probably be more efficient to rely on an anti-lien to secure
these assessments. Given the mobility rate," 4 the chances are that a
debtor would try to sell his home before substantial debts accumulated.
The debtor would then probably tender the overdue payment himself
(if he failed to move out, however, the association could simply wait
until the amount of the accumulated debts justified a personal action).
The anti-lien would thus relieve the association of the need to under-
take costly foreclosure proceedings as a consequence of the transfer of
property. In any case, giving up the protection of a lien on residential
property should not be considered a great loss, at least where state law
provides a substantial homestead exemption and assessment debts are,
by agreement, junior to the purchase money mortgage."15
111 URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, THE HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK 230, 314 (F. B. No. 50,
1964). Uncollected assessments are considered one of the major problems facing home-
owners' associations. Id. at 17 (table 2-6).
112 Asher, Private Covenants in Urban Development, in URBAN RJEDVELoPMENT: PROB-
LEMS AND PRACTICEs 223, 303 n.28 (C. Woodbury ed. 1953).
113 No personal action lies against a transferee for the covenant-debts of his predecessor
in title. Guild v. Wallis, 150 Ore. 69, 80, 40 P.2d 737, 742 (1935); Lingle Water Users'
Ass'n v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 43 Wyo. 41, 56-57, 297 P. 385, 390 (1931). The
same result applies when an assignment of a lease is involved. 51C C.J.$. Landlord &
Tenant § 52 (1968).
114 See note 95 supra.
115 The anti-lien would operate in the homeowners' association context somewhat
differently than in the regular credit transaction context. When 'the debt "runs with
the land," the negative covenant could also be attached to the land. Cf. 5 RSTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY § 540. Since the debts would be recurring, the anti-lien would provide
continuous security. Presumably, however, a homeowner who had paid his past due
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The anti-lien could also supplement an Article 9 security interest' 1 6
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a secured lender has priority in
bankruptcy, and the collection of the debt is secured by the personal
property. The debtor can skip the jurisdiction, however, and thereby
eliminate the possibility of either a personal action or a satisfaction of
the debt from the collateral. As noted above, the anti-lien might
diminish this danger by providing an additional incentive for the
debtor to remain with his real property.
The anti-lien could also prove to be less expensive than foreclosing
on the land to recover a small debt after the owner's disappearance.
Foreclosure costs seem to require a greater margin of equity than the
anti-lien would; therefore, the borrower might use his property, on
which he might not otherwise be able to raise credit, to provide his
lender with an additional incentive to supply him with financing. A
caveat must be added: the anti-lien might be considered an unreason-
able restraint on alienation when combined with the Code powers
over personal property; conversely, remedies available to an Article
9 creditor might be scrutinized by the courts in this situation."17
Once the anti-lien becomes established, interesting variations may
appear. A bank making a short-term loan to a developer could impose
a negative covenant on the latter's mortgaged lands prior to the ini-
tiation of sales. The bank would then have leverage with which to
channel a steady proportion of the incoming revenue towards amortiza-
tion of the debt.
The anti-lien thus furnishes the credit industry with a third alterna-
tive, a compromise between a full security interest and no security at
all. Legal powers over transfer and encumbrance are the "collateral"
that enable the debtor to offer an additional security. Given its chance,
this alternative can add greater flexibility to commercial life.
C. Validity of the Anti-Lien
The anti-lien is subject to two major doctrinal objections: first, that
it violates the rule against restraints on alienation of property, and sec-
assessments would not be precluded from encumbering his land, even though another
debt obligation would be due to mature shortly thereafter.
116 This is particularly true in California. See text and note at note 107 supra.
117 Several scholars contend that the possibility that the debtor would leave the
jurisdiction is one of the major reasons for permitting repossession clauses. See, e.g.,
Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Constitu-
tional and Economic Analysis, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 767 (1973). Since the anti-lien
reduces this possibility, it might surface in a determination of the validity of a repos-
session clause in a particular case. But several other commentators maintain that other,
more important considerations justify recognition of the repossession practice. See, e.g.,
Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession: An Economic Analysis, 47 S. CAL. L. Rav. 82
(1973).
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ond, that it violates the principle that a landowner cannot create new
species of property rights at will. Since the anti-lien does not seem to
frustrate any other public policy, resolution of these objections should
establish the anti-lien's validity as a property interest.
1. Restraints on Alienation.18 It has been said of the rule against
restraints on alienation that "[p]robably nowhere in the law does one
find more resort to dogma than here." 119 The application of the rule
has turned largely on such considerations as the type of property in-
volved, the quality of the interest, and the form of the restraint. 20 Op-
position to mechanical application of the rule was already pronounced
at the beginning of the century' 21 and lately has earned growing sup-
port. Various commentators have urged adoption of a uniform and
more flexible rule that invalidates only unreasonable restraints. 122 Cali-
fornia has recently become the second jurisdiction to embrace the
"new" doctrine; the flexible approach has been the rule in Kentucky
for many years. tm
Moreover, there is dictum favoring a new approach in the decisions
of various jurisdictions,124 and some courts apparently apply the test of
118 Restrictions on the transfer of land are traditionally grouped into three categories:
disabling, forfeiture, and promissory restraints. 4 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 404 (1944).
In the first two categories, there is usually an attempt to use the device of defeasible
titles; in the latter case, only a contractual obligation is imposed. The anti-lien may
operate as a disabling restraint, but differs in that it is usually not created simultaneously
with the transfer of another property interest. For this reason, the anti-lien eludes being
placed within the traditional categories. This article does not seek to build its case for
the anti-lien by drawing analogies to the favorable treatment that courts give to promis-
sory restraints. See id. §§ 406-413.
119 H. CAREY & D. SCHUYLER, ILLINOIs LAW OF FUTURE INTEREsTs § 423, at 542 (1941).
120 See 6 R. POWELL, supra note 68, 839, at 3, which explains that the attempted
restraint "can vary in at least three major particulars: (1) form (2) degree and (3) type
of estate subjected thereto." There are three variants as to the form, five as to the degree,
and five as to the type of estate. Id. at 3-4. Although not all seventy-five variations exist,
this illustration suggests the complexity of the subject.
121 Sweet, Restraints on Alienation, 33 L.Q. REv. 236, 246 (1917).
122 Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Concerning Direct Restraints on Alienation, 57
MICH. L. REv. 1173 (1959); Manning, The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since
Gray, 48 HARv. L. REv. 373, 406 (1935); Comment, Direct Restraints on the Alienation ol
Property in Mississippi, 34 Miss. L.J. 333, 342 (1963).
123 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 68, § 26.22. But the Kentucky courts con-
strue disabling restraints as forfeiture restraints. See Cooper v. Knuckles, 212 Ky. 608, 279
S.W. 1084 (1926); Bernhard, supra note 122, at 1177.
124 See, e.g., Gale v. York Center Community Cooperative, 21 Il1. 2d 86, 92, 171 N.E.2d
30, 33 (1960):
(T]he crucial inquiry should be directed at the utility of the restraint as compared
with the injurious consequences that will flow from its enforcement. If accepted
social and economic considerations dictate that a partial restraint is reasonably
necessary for their fulfillment, such a restraint should be sustained. No restraint
should be sustained simply because it is limited in time, or the class of persons ex-
cluded is not total, or all modes of alienation are not prohibited. These qualifications
lessen the degree to which restraints violate general public policy against restraining
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"reasonableness" inadvertently. The gap between the two approaches
to restraints on alienation is not wide; many recognized exceptions to
the majority rule are defined in terms of reasonableness. 125 Thus, the
time may come when the majority rule, watered down by numerous ex-
ceptions, will be substantially the same as the present minority rule.
The anti-lien undoubtedly withstands the test of reasonableness. The
particular security arrangement is chosen by the parties concerned and
gives each of them some commercial advantages. The covenant not to
transfer is limited in time and can easily be extinguished by prepay-
ment of the debt. Since the landowner has the option to pay and "re-
deem" the land, the device does not seriously restrict alienation of
property.
Furthermore, the anti-lien may be valid even in jurisdictions that ap-
ply the majority rule against restraints on alienation. The anti-lien
does not offend the underlying policies of the rule, which was not origi-
nally designed to apply to this type of transaction.
There are two common explanations for the origins of the rule. Ac-
cording to one theory, after the disappearance of the right of escheat 2o
restrictions on the right to transfer property became invalid.127 To con-
vey a fee and disallow its future alienation was considered to be against
the "nature of the right" and against public policy as well.128 Restraints
on alienation were therefore held void as "repugnant to the fee."' 29
alienation of property and should be considered to that extent; but they are not, in
themselves, sufficient to overcome it. In short, the law of property, like other areas
of the law, is not a mathematical science but takes shape at the direction of social
and economic forces in an ever changing society, and decisions should be made to
turn on these considerations.
See Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 1243, 1254-61 (1955). See also Mattern v. Hertzog, 367 S.W.2d
312, 320 (rex. Sup. Ct. 1963).
125 Bernhard, supra note 122, at 1175.
126 The right was actually defeated by the Statute Quia Emptores Terrarum, 18 Edw.
I stat. 1 (1289-1290).
127 De Peyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467, 500-01 (1852).
128 Lord Coke's explanation for the existence of the rule was that "it is absurd and
repugnant to reason that he, that hath no possibility to have the land revert to him,
should restrain his feoffee in fee simple of all his power to alien . . . . [The] condition
... is void, because his whole interest and propertie is out of him, so as he hath no pos-
sibilitie of a reverter, and it is against trade and traffique, and bargaining and contracting
between man and man ...." E. COKE, THE Fmsr PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF
ENGLAND *233a.
129 It is doubtful that this explanation is historically correct. The policy against re-
straints on alienation was enforced prior to the enactment of the Statute Quia Emptores.
W. FRATCHER, PERPrrMEs AND OTHER RxrRAINTS 2-3 (1954). It has also been suggested
that prior to 1217 a rule of reasonable restraints was applied to gifts. 1 F. POLLOcK & F.
MArrLAND, THE HIstoRy OF ENGLISH LAW 343 (2d ed. 1899). See also J. GRAY, REsrRAiNT
ON ALmNATION OF PROPERTY §§ 19-21 (2d ed. 1895). But the explanation later proved
convenient for those who defended the no restraint policy as a protection against "semi-
feudal" reverter rights.
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The second theory attributes the emergence of the rule to the English
courts' attempts to undermine the power (granted by the Statute De
Donis Conditionalibus' 3°) to convey land subject to a condition that it
remain within the family.131 About two hundred years after the statute's
enactment, the courts actually prevented its application 132 and even-
tually frustrated attempts to achieve the same object by different de-
vices.133
The rule was therefore originally directed against the accumulation
of wealth by a certain class of people (which denied access to ownership
of land to the rest of society), against the imposition of onerous restric-
tions by someone who had died years before, and probably against cer-
tain feudal incidents disguised as "consensual" agreements. It is diffi-
cult to see the relevance of these policies to the commercial context of
the anti-lien.
The purpose of the transaction should determine the applicability
of the rule, and the form of the transaction should be at most a minor
element. 34 As Sweet observes, "A restraint on alienation may be good,
if it is imposed, not for the purpose of making the property inalien-
able, but in order to effect an object which is itself lawful."'135 Thus,
unqualified restraints on alienation are commonly declared invalid be-
cause "[t]he ordinary purpose of such an unqualified restraint is to keep
the property in the family perpetually." 136 Restraints limited in time
are also void if there is evidence that the parties do not intend a pur-
pose other than the restriction on alienation itself. But if these limited
restraints serve a commercial purpose-such as granting pre-emptions
37
or options, 38 or protecting the interests of tenants in common by pre-
130 13 Edw. I, stat. 1 (1285).
131 The statute provided: "Mo whom the land was given under such condition, shall
have no power to aliene the land so given, but that it shall remain unto the issue of them
to whom it was given after their death, or [shall revert] unto the giver, or his heirs, if
issue fails .... " Id.
132 See Taltarum's case, Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, 19 (1472). For a discussion of the case and a
translation of the pleadings, see A. DIGBY, THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
252-58 (5th ed. 1897).
133 See W. FRATCHER, supra note 129, at 25.
134 See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 68, § 26.20, at 441.
135 Sweet, supra note 121, at 246. Manning, supra note 122, at 398, supports Sweet's
view, to some extent, with American authorities. See also Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 1243, 1261
(1955).
136 6 AME.RCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 68, § 26.15, at 429.
137 4 RESTATEMNT OF PROPERTY § 413 (1944).
138 Sweet, supra note 121, at 247. In Mattern v. Herzog, 367 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Sup. ct.
1963), the court upheld an option unlimited in time.
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venting partition139-- they are upheld.140 Thus, when the restraint is
imposed after arms-length bargaining in a commercial transaction, the
intervention of the courts is unnecessary to protect the transferee from
an onerous condition imposed by the transferor.
Current arguments against restraints on alienation also fail to sup-
port application of the rule to anti-lien restrictions. Commentators have
argued that restraints, if allowed, would take property out of commerce,
create a shortage, increase land prices, concentrate wealth among a
limited group of people, discourage improvements and proper main-
tenance of the land, produce an inefficient allocation of resources, and
perhaps prevent creditors of the transferee from satisfying their debts
by putting the property up for execution sale.' 4 ' These arguments are
not applicable to the anti-lien; since prepayment is possible, the owner
of the encumbered land can regain the power to transfer his property
by paying his debt.142
2. The Anti-Lien as a Property Interest. The anti-lien covenants do
not violate the rule that new species of property interests cannot be
created merely at the will of owners of estates.143 Incorporeal fragments
139 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 68, § 26.74; 4 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 412 (1944).
- 140 On the other hand, the fact that the transferee of the title is not seriously re-
stricted by a limitation does not validate the transaction; for example, even if the owner
is allowed to give leases for longer periods, the restraint on the transfer of the title may
be held void. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 68, § 26.38. Even restrictions on
alienation clothed with commercial justification are not upheld when calculated to
achieve windfall gains. A good example is "quarter sales" contracts. Id. § 26.68.
141 Id. § 26.3; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (1972).
142 In certain situations the power to prepay may not prevent hardship. When market
interest rates rise, the debtor may lose the benefit of the lower interest rate specified in
the terms of the anti-lien loan if he wishes to obtain more credit secured by a lien on the
same land. Additional liens cannot be created without the conisent of the anti-lien creditor.
This creditor will therefore be in a position to pressure the debtor into continuing to
borrow only from him and renegotiating the initial loan at the new prevailing interest
rate.
It could be maintained that this situation is the one courts seek to prevent when they
invalidate prohibitions against further encumbrances in mortgages. Indeed, if these
restraints were upheld, a debtor's first mortgagee would have an unfair advantage over
potential creditors, and access to the money market would be difficult for new lenders.
Nevertheless, the possibility of prepayment limits the bargaining strength of the creditor.
The inherent shortcomings of anti-lien interests indicate that they will not be used to
secure long term or sizable loans. The analogy to the restrictions on mortgages is therefore
not compelling.
Of course, the same creditor should not be able to obtain both a mortgage and an anti-
lien on the same collateral-for instance, a mortgage to secure 80 percent of the debt and
an anti-lien to secure 20 percent. The two transactions should be viewed as one and
the testraint invalidated because a mortgage is involved.
143 "Mt must not ... be supposed that incidents of a novel kind can be devised and
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of ownership rights can qualify as the object of property interests. Fur-
thermore, the rule does not completely prohibit the recognition of new
interests in land.
The idea that incorporeal fragments of ownership can be the object
of a property interest is not new. 44 Limitations on the right to transfer
land are frequently recognized-for example, conveyance of a defeasi-
ble title 45 or similar conditions in a lease.146 Similarly, covenants may
restrain a condominium owner from selling or granting his interest un-
less certain requirements are satisfied.147 The unfortunate body of case
law on racially restrictive covenants provides other examples. In these
cases, the basic right of landowners to curtail their power of alienation
was assumed; the question went mainly to its breadth. 48 In most juris-
attached to property at the fancy or caprice of any owner. It is dearly inconvenient both
to the science of the law and to the public weal that such a latitude should be given."
Keppell v. Bailey, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1049 (Ch. 1834); see Eckert v. Peters, 55 N.J. Eq.
379, 386, 36 A. 491, 493 (Ch. 1897); Brewer v. Marshall & Cheeseman, 19 NJ. Eq. 537,
545-46 (Ct. Err. & App. 1868); Lingle Water Users' Ass'n v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass'n,
43 Wyo. 41, 51, 297 P. 385, 388 (1931); Conard, An Analysis of Licenses in Land, 42 COLUM.
L. REv. 809, 826 (1942).
144 For example, the courts have given full property interest recognition to easements
giving permission to cause a nuisance.
The owner's title is no more than a "bundle of privileges" of which the right to be
free from harmful activities on other land in the vicinity is but one. The owner may
convey the whole bundle, but he is privileged to take one from the bundle and convey
it. This has been done times wthout number.
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Kearnes, 71 Ohio App. 209, 219, 48 N.E.2d 1012, 1016 (Ct. App.
1943). According to this reasoning, powers of conveyance can also be the subject of a
transaction.
145 See 4 RESAT.EMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 406, 407 (1944). Some cases have upheld forfeiture
restraints securing an obligation to support the grantor. Hutchinson v. Loomis, 244 S.W.2d
751 (Ky. 1951) (dictum); Bank of Hartford v. Buffalow, 217 Ala. 583, 117 So. 183 (1928).
(It is unclear whether Buffalow was decided on grounds of constructive fraud or violation
of the condition. See McAdory v. Jones, 71 So. 2d 526, 528 (Ala. 1954).) Although these
cases are in some aspects similar to the anti-lien, the courts have treated "geriatric trans-
fers" as sui generis. Russell v. Carver, 208 Ala. 219, 94 So. 128 (1922). See also text and
note at note 27 supra.
146 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 68, § 26.51.
147 See Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967); Berger,
Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLuhM L. REV. 987, 1017-19
(1963); Browder, Restraints on the Alienation of Condominium Units (The Right of
First Refusal), 1970 ILL. L.F. 231.
If the agreement is not in violation of a constitutional right, public policy, or any
other established rule (such as the rule against restraints on alienation), the courts will
enforce the restriction among the contracting parties as well as against subsequent
transferees.
148 In a leading Louisiana case, the court explained:
[O]wnership is composed of the rights to use, to enjoy and to dispose of .... The
two first of these elements, the use and the usufruct, are admittedly susceptible of
separation from the other elements and of subdivision after having been segregated;
why then is not the third, the abusus, the right to dispose of, susceptible of being
dealt with in like manner? . . . The right to alienate is but one of the constituent
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dictions, prior to the Supreme Court decision in Shelley v. Kraemer,149
completion of a transfer (when the transferee had notice) did not limit
the promisee to merely contractual remedies. 150
The specific property interest that neutralizes powers of alienation
has been used to secure property values, assure the ability of unit
owners to pay their share of common expenses, 5' and provide other
commercial benefits.152 There thus seems to be no reason to prohibit
the use of this device to secure a debt.
Moreover, the rule against the creation of new species of property
interests has been interpreted not as a broad prohibition against the
recognition of all new interests in land, but rather as a rule against
those rights that serve no social purpose. 53 In recent years, new ease-
ments have been recognized, and covenants have been widely used to
provide for the changing needs of the real estate market. At a time
when the law of new towns is "legislated" through comprehensive "code
covenants,"1' 4 tiseems out of place to argue that new forms of incor-
poreal interests should not be recognized.
elements of the right to dispose of .... [T]he said stipulation ... does not create a
mere personal obligation . . . but creates a real obligation.
Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 736-37, 67 So. 641, 645-46 (1915).
In common law jurisdictions, courts rarely explained the precise effects of these cove-
nants. Some courts took an approach similar to Cazeaux, and declared the prohibited
transactions null and void. Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Cornish v.
O'Donoghue, 30 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 871 (1929). Another court
considered the forbidden conveyances voidable, so that upon successful suit title would
be revested with the transferor. Swain v. Maxwell, 355 Mo. 448, 196 S.W.2d 780 (1946).
In other cases, the decrees were worded in less precise form. Mays v. Burgess, 147 F.2d
869 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945) (transaction "set aside'); Porter v. Pryor,
164 S.W.2d 353 (Mo. 1942) (cancelling the deed); Ridgway v. Cockburn, 163 Misc. 511,
296 N.Y.S. 936 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (covenant ordered enforced after completion of prohibited
transaction); Linder v. Stapp, 198 Okla. 866, 178 P.2d 617 (1947) (same); Hemsley v.
Hough, 195 Okla. 298, 157 P.2d 182 (1945) (cancelling a lease); Lyons v. Wallen, 191 Okla.
567, 133 P.2d 555 (1942) (cancelling the deed). In these cases, with the exception of Swain
v. Maxwell, the courts did not address the question of the correct construction; many
simply affirmed the decision of a lower court.
149 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
350 6 A -mm-cAN LAW OF PRoPERTY, supra note 68, § 26.34. The majority view is that
an equitable servitude is a property interest. 2 id. § 9.24, at 403. The possibility of record-
ing meant that a promisory restraint on alienation could be enforced against an assignee
somewhat. like a disabling restraint. The technical requirements for the creation of an
anti-lien are similar to other security interests' in land, and it should therefore operate
as a "legal" and not an "equitable" restraint. Since the anti-lien is ineffective against
other creditors, the objection expressed in 6 id. § 26.34, at 460, to recognizing such
restraints is inapplicable here.
151 See also text and notes at notes 111-15 supra.
152 See text and notes at notes 137-39 supra.
153 See Conard, supra note 143, at 826.
154 See Comment, Democracy in the New Towns: The Limits of Private Government,
36 U. Cm. L. Rav. 379 (1969).
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Not every contractual right can be "attached" to land as a property
interest. A new interest in land must have certain characteristics simi-
lar to recognized rights in rem. The anti-lien should not be considered
an easement, although it restricts the use of the "natural incidents" of
ownership and provides, by its negative effect, a benefit to others. The
easement analysis is inappropriate because the promisee acquires no
actual "use or enjoyment of ... land;"1 55 the anti-lien right is related
to a business transaction only remotely associated with enjoyment of
land.156 Since it does not "touch and concern" land, the anti-lien also
would not qualify as an equitable servitude, even if the problem of
benefit in gross (American courts do not recognize equitable servitudes
when the benefit is in gross' 5' ) were somehow resolved.
On the other hand, the anti-lien is similar to covenants creating
charges or liens upon property. These interests are created simply by
the agreement of the original parties, 158 and the absence of a dominant
tenement does not prevent recognition of the property right. The "neg-
ative mortgage" is intimately connected with the debt, and transfer of
the anti-lien is possible only if the debt is assigned at the same time.159
The debt does not "run with the land" (indeed, the land is not sup-
posed to "run") but is a condition for the existence of the right.
Differences between a charge or a lien and the anti-lien are due to
the different nature of the "collateral" involved. The restrictions of the
anti-lien debtor's powers are not an asset to foreclose on or to sell in
satisfaction of a debt. But the similarity in the relations between the
parties (creditor and debtor) and in the commercial functions that the
the property interests serve brings the anti-lien within the formal re-
quirements for the creation of a lien.6 0
CONCLUSION
Lenders and borrowers seeking to secure the payment of a debt with
an interest in land have long been confined to the traditional alterna-
155 See 5 RESTATEmENT OF PROPERTY § 450(a) (1944).
156 Cf. Hill v. Tupper, 159 Eng. Rep. 5 (Ex. 1863). Negative easements in gross are
generally not recognized, 2 AmmECAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 68, § 8.12.
157 2 AMEmcAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 68, § 9.32, at 429-30.
158 Dunham, Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 8 J. LAw & ECON. 133, 147-48
(1965).
159 See note 72 supra.
160 The operation of the anti-lien can be sustained in an alternative way. An owner
can convey a term of years as a security interest; he is transferring a fragment of his
ownership to secure a payment of a debt. The same thing is done in the anti-lien case.
The parties' purposes are similar, but the rights conveyed are different and provide
different kinds of security. It is true that a proprietary restraint on alienation usually
has other characteristics (for example, it benefits a neighboring owner or a transferor
rather than a creditor), but this deviation is not significant because the anti-lien's only
purpose is to secure the payment of a debt.
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tives of first and second mortgages. This paper has proposed the recog-
nition of a third alternative. The anti-lien can be a useful security
device for a small loan, particularly when a second mortgage is unavail-
able or its enforcement prohibitively expensive.
Unfortunately, reliance upon equitable lien analysis has distracted
the courts from what should have been the real issues concerning the
anti-lien. Provisions like the ones discussed in this paper should be
read at face value, and traditional doctrines-against restraints on
alienation and against the creation of new property interests-should
not be invoked to condemn the anti-lien interest. The courts should
adopt a new approach that allows lending institutions to experiment
with the anti-lien and take advantage of its capacity to enhance the
flexibility of credit transactions.
